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NO. 24 JUNE 2018 Introduction 
No “Global Britain” after Brexit 
Leaving the EU Weakens UK Foreign and Security Policy,  
Closer Ties Remain in Germany’s Interest 
Claudia Major and Nicolai von Ondarza 
Under the leitmotif of “Global Britain”, the British government is painting Brexit 
as a unique opportunity to rethink its foreign and security policy: stronger, more 
influential, more global. The heart of the concept is a global outlook and bilateral 
agreements to compensate the loss of EU ties. In fact, however, the looming reality 
of Brexit appears to be weakening the United Kingdom diplomatically and spot-
lighting the constraints that individual nation states face. Confronted with rising 
transatlantic tensions and a resurgent China and Russia, the EU has no interest in 
having a weakened and insecure neighbour right across the Channel. But neither 
will the EU offer the UK special access to its foreign and security policy as a third 
country. In parallel to the Brexit negotiations, Germany should therefore keep 
channels open by intensifying the bilateral relationship and proposing new Euro-
pean foreign policy consultation formats. 
 
The United Kingdom traditionally sees itself 
as a global actor with diplomatic and mili-
tary influence. Yet London’s geopolitical 
influence was fading even before the 2016 
Brexit referendum, which has only acceler-
ated the process. With attention distracted 
by domestic issues (especially the Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014, the 
Brexit referendum and the ensuing exit 
process), the British have been largely absent 
from central international conflicts, includ-
ing the Ukraine crisis and the war in Syria. 
At the same time Prime Minister Theresa 
May and her ministers expound major 
foreign policy ambitions under the motto 
“Global Britain”. In the utopian version of 
Brexit the UK, freed from the constraints 
of EU membership, steps out into the world 
to renew its globalist outlook and influ-
ence. In this sense Prime Minister Theresa 
May and Foreign Minister Boris Johnson 
envision a global foreign policy that estab-
lishes a presence in every region of the 
globe, revives old alliances, creates new 
partnerships, strengthens the multilateral 
order and – after leaving the EU – a UK 
that creates its own system of free trade 
agreements with the rest of the world. 
At this juncture, London has neither 
spelled out what those lofty goals would 
mean in conceptual terms nor allocated 
adequate resources to their fulfilment, as 
the British Parliament recently criticised. 
Even after Brexit, the three traditional 
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pillars of British foreign policy – relations 
with the EU and European states, with the 
United States, and with the most important 
international organisations – will remain-
ing structurally defining. But London will 
find itself forced to adapt them to the new 
circumstances. 
A Difficult Relationship 
with the EU 
As the UK shapes its post-Brexit relationship 
with the EU, in the sphere of foreign and 
security policy it is seeking to preserve the 
greatest possible access to EU policies and 
processes. 
To date foreign and security policy has 
been explicitly bracketed out of the Brexit 
talks. Following the political agreement 
in March 2018 on most of the separation 
issues (with the crucial exception of the 
Northern Ireland question) and the tran-
sition period, the talks now move on to 
translating the political agreement into 
legal form, seeking a solution for Northern 
Ireland and setting the framework for the 
future relationship. Both sides aim to dis-
cuss cooperation on foreign and security 
policy separately from the economic rela-
tionship. Two areas are specifically involved 
here: Firstly, access to the EU’s existing 
structures and processes, including the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) and the 
planning process for EU operations. Here 
the question of how the UK can participate 
in the EU’s security debates as a third coun-
try needs to be answered, along with the 
conditions under which it is permitted to 
participate in joint projects (if at all). 
Secondly, access to the emerging EU 
defence structures will need to be clarified. 
Since 2016 the EU has initiated a set of 
changes which can produce a qualitative 
leap. This applies above all to the Per-
manent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 
which enables groups of EU states to co-
operate more closely; the European Defence 
Fund (EDF), through which the Commission 
intends to fund joint research, development 
and procurement; and CARD (Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence), to coordinate 
defence planning at EU level. 
One irony of Brexit is that London is 
seeking to participate as a third state in 
parts of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) that it rejected while it was 
a member of the EU. Until recently, for 
example, the British were blocking an 
increase in the European Defence Agency’s 
budget. Although London supplied per-
sonnel and equipment for operations (for 
example for EU Operation Atalanta), its 
contribution remained small compared to 
the capabilities of the British armed forces. 
Especially in foreign and security policy, the 
Brexiteers have failed to make the case that 
EU membership effectively constrained 
the United Kingdom’s room for manoeuvre. 
After all, like all member states London pos-
sessed a veto – of which it made regular 
use, in particular in defence matters. 
At the 2018 Munich Security Conference 
in February, Prime Minister May named two 
reasons why the United Kingdom wishes 
to cooperate closely with the EU on foreign 
and security policy: Firstly London wants to 
avoid being excluded from the major Euro-
pean diplomatic debates. Shortly after that 
speech, in March 2018, the British experi-
enced the EU’s value as a diplomatic forum, 
when the EU institutions coordinated the 
European response to the poisoning of the 
former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal. 
Secondly, London wishes to limit the 
repercussions of Brexit on its own defence 
industry and preserve its access to the EU 
market and future cooperation projects like 
the EDF. The latter has the potential to be-
come a decisive factor for the development 
of the EU’s defence industry. Recent doubts 
over the reliability of the transatlantic 
relationship have reinforced calls for more 
EU security and defence cooperation. At 
the same time, the legal framework of EU 
defence cooperation – in particular single 
market rules – makes it harder for the 
non-member UK and its defence industry 
to participate. The diplomatic row over 
Galileo, where UK firms are to be excluded 
from future contracts, has highlighted this 
challenge. 
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But the EU-27 also has an interest in 
cooperation with London. Even after Brexit, 
security problems affecting the EU will 
also touch on the United Kingdom (and vice 
versa), be they stabilisation operations in 
the European neighbourhood or dealing 
with a resurgent Russia. In contrast to the 
rest of the EU (bar France), the UK continues 
to possess unique security and defence 
capabilities. For example, the United King-
dom has Europe’s strongest reconnaissance 
capabilities, with 44 percent of the EU’s air-
borne early warning and control planes and 
almost half of its military transport aircraft. 
Nevertheless, the EU’s post-Brexit rela-
tionship with the United Kingdom will be 
no substitute for the current integration 
in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. There are two reasons for this: First-
ly, the EU has made it clear that it takes a 
hard line on the CSDP too. As a third state 
the United Kingdom will not have a seat at 
the table when the Union takes decisions 
on foreign and security policy. On the other 
hand, an arrangement like Norway’s – 
which has no vote on EU foreign policy but 
participates in sanctions and supplies fund-
ing and troops for EU operations – will not 
be acceptable for the United Kingdom. 
Secondly, talks between the EU and 
third states are generally conducted be-
tween senior EU officials (like the High 
Representative) and their counterparts, in 
this case the British foreign secretary. But 
in foreign and security policy this is no 
substitute for direct dialogue between 
member states within the EU institutions. 
This faces both sides with a geostrategic 
dilemma: Despite shared interests, the EU 
will keep the United Kingdom at arm’s 
length where its foreign and security policy 
is concerned. 
Bilateralism and Small Formats 
Faced with the prospect of limited partici-
pation in EU processes, London is looking 
for alternative forums. Especially in the 
field of security, this has led the UK to seek 
to strengthen their bilateral relationships in 
Europe, as evidenced by agreements with 
France, Poland and – prospectively – 
Germany. 
Security and defence relations with 
France were already close before the Brexit 
vote. In the Lancaster House Treaties of 
2010 London and Paris agreed to deepen 
ties in a wide range of defence and security 
topics. Both sides emphasise the impor-
tance of their cooperation and their leading 
roles in security and defence matters, 
pointing to their status as nuclear powers 
and UN Security Council members, their 
high defence spending and their experi-
enced armed forces. In January 2018 they 
agreed a further deepening of cooperation, 
including in the maritime sector and the 
fight against terrorism and instability 
especially in the Sahel. 
The United Kingdom also wants to partic-
ipate in France’s new prestige project, the 
European Intervention Initiative (EI2). EI2 
seeks to unite politically willing and mili-
tary able European states, such as Denmark, 
Estonia and Italy, to jointly carry out mili-
tary interventions more effectively. While 
Germany criticises the EI2 for organising 
defence cooperation outside the EU struc-
tures, the French see exactly this European 
(rather than EU) character as a pragmatic 
possibility for keeping London in the Euro-
pean security cooperation after Brexit and 
therefore ensuring Europe’s capacity to act. 
Yet, the decisions of January 2018 are not 
a quantum leap. Rather they reflect the ef-
forts of both countries to preserve continuity 
in the relationship despite Brexit. In view of 
the strict French positions on other Brexit 
questions, this serves the British interests. 
The closer cooperation with Poland 
agreed in December 2017 is new. Although 
planning began before the Brexit referen-
dum, both states have noticeably stepped 
up their efforts since the Brexit vote. They 
intend to expand cooperation in areas like 
training, cyber-security and defence indus-
tries. Cooperation on fighting Russian dis-
information represents a central element, 
to which London has committed five mil-
lion pounds. 
Germany, in contrast, initially scaled 
back bilateral cooperation after the Brexit 
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vote in 2016, to avoid undermining the 
EU’s Brexit negotiations. Not until April 
2018 did the foreign ministers of the two 
states announce a “strategic dialogue on 
foreign and security policy” to direct atten-
tion to shared challenges beyond Brexit. 
The first goal of this dialogue is the adop-
tion of a bilateral “Compact on Global 
Responsibilities” in autumn 2018, in which 
London and Berlin intend to name topics 
for cooperation. The two defence ministers 
also hope to agree closer cooperation in 
summer 2018, for example on cyber-secu-
rity. Thus far, however, both announced 
initiatives remain empty shells. This is 
symptomatic for German-British relations 
in the Brexit context: One reason for Lon-
don to seek a closer partnership with Berlin 
in security questions is its belief that Ger-
many holds decisive sway over the Brexit 
talks. Berlin on the other hand prioritises 
cooperation with the EU-27. 
Alongside bilateral relationships, London 
is also seeking to deepen cooperation in 
existing formats. These include the hitherto 
rather marginal Northern Group, to which 
Germany also belongs. In addition, the 
British government hopes to strengthen the 
Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), in which the 
Baltic states, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Norway participate. The June 2017 decision 
by Sweden and Finland to join the JEF rep-
resented a success for London. The British 
focus on these formats and its command of 
a multinational battalion in Estonia (within 
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, eFP) 
underline how the United Kingdom is con-
solidating its role as a regional leader in the 
Baltic states and northern Europe. 
These formats can serve to link the UK 
into the EU, and possibly as a way to chan-
nel UK interests into EU debates. They also 
offer opportunities to shape collective re-
sponses to security problems in and around 
Europe that will also continue to affect 
London. With the exception of British-
French relations, this strategy has proven 
largely fruitless to date. There remains a 
yawning gap between the rhetoric of quali-
tatively new relations and the practice. 
An Increasingly Unbalanced 
“Special Relationship” 
The most important pillar of British foreign 
and security policy has traditionally been 
its “special relationship” with the United 
States, in the sense of a dense web of politi-
cal, economic and military ties. The United 
Kingdom’s uppermost security objective re-
mains to keep the United States committed 
to Europe and to stay a relevant military 
partner for the Americans. To underline its 
value it therefore was the United Kingdom 
that supplied the largest non-US contin-
gents for the US interventions in Afghani-
stan and Iraq. 
But the relationship was already in flux 
before Brexit. On the one hand, the United 
Kingdom’s military significance for the 
United States has declined markedly; on 
the other, British public support for major 
military interventions collapsed after the 
experience of the Iraq War. This was starkly 
underlined in 2013 when the House of Com-
mons voted against military intervention 
in Syria. In the fight against the so-called 
Islamic State, London initially restricted its 
support for the United States to Iraq and 
only intervened in Syria after France tri-
ggered the EU’s military assistance clause 
following the November 2015 terrorist 
attacks in Paris. 
The Brexit vote has caused another shift 
in the strategic importance of the “special 
relationship” for the United Kingdom, and 
amplified the asymmetry. From US perspec-
tive London becomes a less valuable diplo-
matic asset after Brexit, as it can no longer 
represent Washington’s interests within 
the EU. 
May’s government, on the other hand, 
has made a free trade agreement with the 
United States a cornerstone of her Brexit 
strategy. In line with her “Global Britain” 
plans, Theresa May hopes to negotiate com-
prehensive free trade agreements with the 
rest of the world. The flagship of this ven-
ture is a deep free trade agreement with the 
United States, which is the destination for 
about 18 percent of British exports and thus 
the United Kingdom’s second-largest trading 
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partner (after the EU-27 with about 48 per-
cent). The Trump Administration, which 
itself tends towards bilateral rather than 
multilateral trade agreements, has already 
declared its fundamental willingness to 
negotiate. But to date the process has not 
moved beyond preliminary talks while even 
close partners such as Canada have been 
targeted with additional tariffs. In any case, 
such an agreement cannot come into effect 
before 2021 at the earliest, when the tran-
sition period is foreseen to end. It is certainly 
clear that a British-American free trade 
agreement is a significantly higher priority 
for London than for Washington. 
In fact, striking diplomatic tensions have 
arisen between London and Washington. 
During the presidential election campaign, 
Donald Trump was one of the few inter-
national leaders to openly support Brexit. 
Initially, Theresa May was the first Euro-
pean leader Trump received in Washington, 
complete with public celebration of the 
“special relationship”. 
But in January 2018 Trump cancelled a 
planned trip to London to open the new US 
embassy, in expectation of large-scale pro-
tests. He had already visited five other EU 
states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
Poland. A state visit to the United Kingdom 
has been postponed several times in the 
face of major public and parliamentary 
push-back, and is now scheduled for sum-
mer 2018. After Donald Trump dissemi-
nated videos by the extreme right-wing 
“Britain First” movement on Twitter even 
Prime Minister May felt forced to publicly 
criticise him. Although those diplomatic 
spats can be attributed to President Trump’s 
idiosyncratic style of communication it is 
striking that they have been conducted in 
such a visible manner. On the other hand 
cooperation at working level has been 
largely unaffected. And finally the United 
States (like the European allies) granted 
the British unambiguous support over the 
Skripal incident, and expelled sixty Russian 
diplomats. 
Diverging Priorities 
What is even more striking is that the 
United Kingdom has joined the other EU 
states in opposing central strategic shifts in 
foreign and security policy by the Trump 
Administration, despite its heavy depend-
ency. Four examples stand out: 
Firstly the Iran nuclear agreement, which 
the United Kingdom was central to negotiat-
ing as part of the EU-3. When Trump first 
called the agreement into question and 
finally withdrew from it, London joined 
Berlin and Paris in defending the deal in 
explicit opposition to Washington. 
The second example is the Paris Climate 
Accord, from which President Trump has 
announced the United States will also with-
draw. During the G-7 summit the United 
Kingdom sided with the EU and the other 
three European members (France, Germany, 
Italy) in defending the Accord and has com-
mitted to abide by its own climate commit-
ments after Brexit. 
In the growing trade conflict between 
the United States and the EU (as well as 
Canada, Japan and other US allies), the 
Trump administration’s additional tariffs 
on steel and aluminium also affect the EU, 
including the UK. This has been criticised 
by UK Prime Minister May, as has Trump’s 
decision to “unsign” the June 2018 G-7 dec-
laration. With the UK presumably bound to 
the EU customs union until at least 2021, 
it will likely be caught in the crossfire if the 
EU-US trade conflict further intensifies. 
Donald Trump’s decision to move the US 
embassy in Israel to Jerusalem is a fourth 
example, calling into question the two-state 
solution for the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
Here again London joined the EU in criti-
cism. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has 
made it clear that the United Kingdom will 
be maintaining its embassy in Tel Aviv and 
upholding the two-state solution. 
It is striking, finally, that the United 
States under Trump – even more than 
in the past – picks and chooses European 
partners according to policy area and con-
venience, and has no qualms about playing 
them off against each other. London was 
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especially peeved that President Trump 
coordinated most closely with French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron in advance of the 
April 2018 air strikes against Syria. Prime 
Minister May then deliberately disregarded 
usual parliamentary procedure to enable 
Britain to participate in the attacks. 
All in all, the “special relationship” is not 
transpiring to be the foreign and security 
policy lifeline that leading Brexiteers like 
Boris Johnson wished for. While the asym-
metry has expanded to London’s disadvant-
age, British responses to Trump’s major 
strategic policy shifts have been closer to 
the EU’s. That should not lead Germany 
and the EU-27 to gloat, but encourage them 
– whether despite or because of Brexit – 
to keep London close in central foreign 
policy and security matters. 
International Organisations 
The third traditional pillar of British foreign 
and security policy is its presence in inter-
national organisations, the most important 
being its permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council, NATO membership, participation 
in the G7/G20 summits, and voting rights in 
institutions like the IMF, the OECD and the 
WTO. Although London potentially loses 
access to EU coordination in international 
organisations, it will presumably continue 
to coordinate closely with its European part-
ners, whether bilaterally or multilaterally. 
But the influence it can exercise through 
these forums is limited: London’s most 
recent veto in the UN Security Council was 
close to thirty years ago, its last solo veto 
(without the United States or France) almost 
half a century ago. On the other hand, 
London almost always introduces its reso-
lutions in den UN Security Council jointly 
with Paris and/or Washington. Meanwhile, 
the fifty-three-member Commonwealth of 
Nations is too heterogeneous to become a 
relevant foreign policy and security forum. 
NATO as Potential Beneficiary 
NATO is a different matter. If the United 
Kingdom can no longer shape collective 
answers to security problems within the 
EU framework, NATO will become the main 
forum for coordination with allies. London 
already appears to be stepping up its en-
gagement, and emphasises that it is one of 
the few countries to fulfil both NATO’s 2 
percent and 20 percent targets (2 percent 
of GDP spent on defence, with 20 percent 
of that going to investment). 
In absolute figures the United Kingdom 
has the highest defence spending of all 
European NATO members. Together with 
France it deploys the most troops on opera-
tions. London has already announced its 
intention to boost its engagement, although 
without naming details. Cyber-security, in 
which it has great expertise, would be con-
ceivable. London is also increasing its per-
sonnel and seeking to assume political 
leadership. Finally the British also point to 
their contributions to NATO’s defence and 
deterrence measures, such as leading one of 
the four multinational battalions that form 
NATO’s eFP on its Eastern flank. But that 
was decided before the Brexit vote and 
therefore cannot be regarded as an expres-
sion of heightened commitment. 
NATO stands to benefit from greater 
British engagement nonetheless, as it will 
represent the only defence forum in Europe 
where London continues to play a role and 
can back up its “Global Britain” ambitions. 
The Limits of the Nation State 
The analysis of the three pillars of British 
foreign policy demonstrates that the United 
Kingdom’s desire to compensate the nega-
tive consequences of Brexit by stepping up 
its international engagement shows little 
by way of results to date. In practice Lon-
don can point above all to continuity, for 
example in the Franco-British context, but 
not as yet to anything substantially new. 
That said, in these times continuity is itself 
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positive. And it will take time before agree-
ments produce results. 
At the same time there are very clear 
limits to what a single nation state can 
achieve on its own in terms of foreign 
policy, even one as large as the United 
Kingdom. Close cooperation with partners 
will be crucial in tackling central foreign 
and security policy challenges, be it the 
future of the Iran deal or dealing with Rus-
sia or North Korea. This was illustrated very 
clearly by the Skripal incident, where Lon-
don required the support of its European 
partners because unilateral foreign policy 
responses have little impact against a coun-
try the size of Russia. As a non-EU member 
the United Kingdom will no longer be able 
to shape EU decisions but will simply have 
to decide whether to accept them. 
Another factor is that London has yet to 
put much in the way of resources behind its 
“Global Britain” concept. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office has recruited addi-
tional civil servants, but most of the extra 
resources have gone into dealing with the 
consequences of Brexit, for example in the 
area of trade or increasing the resources for 
bilateral relations in Europe. The UK will 
keep or even expand its Brussels representa-
tion to substitute the coordination done via 
EU bodies. Nor is the military dimension 
of “Global Britain” by any means secure. 
In the 2015 Spending Review, defence was 
spared from cuts, with defence spending 
due to rise by 5 percent in real terms by 
2020/21. Yet the parallel 2015 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review made a range 
of new commitments, more in fact than the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) can afford from 
the 5 percent increase (partly because it was 
over-optimistic on efficiency savings). Now 
London has to choose between providing 
additional funds to uphold its military 
planning or reducing capabilities and re-
scheduling programmes to stay within 
budget. The British MOD has even commis-
sioned a study on a UK substitute for the 
EU’s Galileo Global Positioning System, 
which would siphon substantial resources 
away from other programmes to duplicate 
a capability that already exists. 
The British MOD will offer answers in 
summer 2018 with the publication of the 
Modernising Defence Programme (MDP). 
Here it is confronted with the tricky task 
of preserving traditional capabilities while 
proposing cuts and planning changes in 
order to establish new ones (for example 
new technologies, artificial intelligence). 
And that is before the potential conse-
quences of Brexit are taken into account. If 
the British economy suffers even more after 
Brexit, London will be unlikely to be able to 
maintain its military spending at the cur-
rent level. 
A Geostrategic Dilemma 
So Brexit represents a foreign policy and 
security challenge for London as well as an 
economic one. The United Kingdom’s mili-
tary relevance for the United States has 
declined. The goal of a “Global Britain” con-
trasts with a reality in which the United 
Kingdom is forced to concentrate more on 
Europe while its global influence dwindles. 
Since the Brexit vote London has therefore 
been concentrating increasingly on the 
larger EU states. This is largely a symbolic 
affair, however, that has produced little 
in the way of substance. 
For the EU-27 and specifically Germany 
this complicates foreign policy and security 
interactions with the United Kingdom. Two 
geostrategic interests need to be reconciled 
here. On the one side, the principle that the 
EU has no interest in offering a third coun-
try the benefits of membership without the 
obligations also applies to foreign and secu-
rity policy. On the other, however future 
economic relations pan out, Germany and 
the rest of the EU-27 have an interest in 
keeping the United Kingdom on their side 
in important international issues – espe-
cially in light of deteriorating transatlantic 
relations. 
In view of these conflicting interests, it 
is necessary to look beyond EU-UK security 
relations, which will inevitably be less close 
after Brexit. Damage control is in the inter-
ests of both sides and requires maintaining 
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dialogue as well as the willingness and 
ability for joint action. As a fall-back, a 
three-pronged approach can ensure that 
the United Kingdom remains close: firstly 
intensified bilateral exchange, secondly and 
in parallel better use of informal minilateral 
formats in Europe, and thirdly cooperation 
between the EU as a whole and the United 
Kingdom as a third country. The challenge 
will be to avoid both undermining ongoing 
Brexit talks and weakening existing insti-
tutional consultation formats. 
The bilateral strategic dialogue between 
Berlin and London announced in April 
2018 can contribute to damage limitation. 
With respect to Brexit three conditions 
should be applied: Firstly the EU’s decision-
making autonomy must be preserved; all 
questions of cooperation between the EU 
and the United Kingdom should be regu-
lated collectively via the EU institutions 
rather than among the largest EU states. 
Secondly, bilateral cooperation cannot 
preempt the future shape of the EU-UK 
relationship, including in CFSP/CSDP. In 
addition, it is still uncertain whether a new 
arrangement for foreign and security policy 
cooperation between the UK and the EU 
will be ready as envisioned in March 2019, 
when most political attention in the Brexit 
talks will focus on securing a withdrawal 
agreement first. Thirdly, the EU member 
states must ward against the danger of the 
United Kingdom playing “divide and rule”, 
for example through regular discussions in 
the EU-27 context on how to deal with the 
United Kingdom as a third country. This 
allows space for bilateral engagements with 
the UK, where for instance the new German-
British strategic dialogue could address is-
sues such as crisis prevention and manage-
ment in Europe’s neighbourhood, cyber-
security, counter-terrorism, procurement, 
and the continuation of the Berlin Process 
for the Western Balkans (which began as a 
bilateral British-German initiative). 
In parallel to improved bilateral dia-
logue, minilateral formats could ensure 
foreign and security policy coordination 
between London and the EU states, fol-
lowing the pattern of existing quad (United 
States, France, Germany, United Kingdom) 
and EU-3 formats. There are numerous 
recent examples, including the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement, where central foreign policy 
initiatives have been prepared in smaller 
formats before the traditional instruments 
became involved. The joint declaration by 
London, Paris, Washington and Berlin in 
March 2018 condemning the use of a 
chemical agent in the Skripal incident also 
demonstrates the power of these formats. 
Wherever possible existing channels should 
be used to coordinate responses to current 
developments, rather than creating new 
formats. 
This does not mean bypassing the new 
formal EU-UK relationship. Instead prag-
matic use should be made of existing chan-
nels and established working relations, to 
the benefit of both the European Union and 
the United Kingdom. 
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